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Introduction
In critical care medicine we use a high-technology care plan
to reverse organ system failure. Sometimes, however, organs
can only be brought back to nominal function, creating
dependence on others to supply sustenance. If these
patients had never expressed a clear preference to be
allowed to die in such circumstances, then their surrogate’s
preferences may conflict. We examine the aftermath of a
case of a patient in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) whose
surrogate conflicts lead to legal complications.
The case
Following an anoxic insult, a 30-year-old female patient
resides in a nursing home for 2 years without any evidence of
meaningful neurologic recovery. There is some controversy
regarding the extent of her brain damage; some doctors have
diagnosed her as being in a PVS whereas others disagree. It
is agreed that she suffers severe neurologic deficit. At
baseline she opens her eyes and appears to track family
members; she smiles but she does not follow commands.
She is hemodynamically stable and is sustained by a feeding
tube. There is no living will. Both the husband and family
state that the patient has never volunteered an opinion
regarding end-of-life issues in the past, apart from one
occasion when she casually mentioned that she would not
ever want to ‘live like a vegetable’.
Her husband petitions you to remove the feeding tube and
‘let my wife die with dignity’. However, her family says that
the patient responds to them and they do not feel she is in
any discomfort. The family opposes removal of the feeding
tube. The patient’s mother appeals to the State to intervene
and stop any attempt at removal of life support on
humanitarian grounds. The current law of the State she
resides in is that there must be ‘clear and convincing’
evidence of a patient’s wishes before life-sustaining
treatment (LST) can be removed from that patient.
Would you remove the feeding tube?
Commentary
Ethics roundtable debate: Withdrawal of tube feeding in a
patient with persistent vegetative state where the patient’s
wishes are unclear and there is family dissension
Tom Buckley1, David Crippen2, Anthony L DeWitt3, Malcolm Fisher4, Antonios Liolios5, 
Christine L Scheetz6 and Leslie M Whetstine7
1Chief of Service, Intensive Care Unit, Princess Margaret Hospital, Lai Chi Kok, Kowloon, Hong Kong
2Associate Professor, Department of Critical Care Medicine, University of Pittsburgh Medical Centre, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA
3Attorney, Bartimus, Frickleton, Robertson and Obetz, Jefferson City, Missouri, USA
4Clinical Professor, University of Sydney, Intensive Care Unit, Royal North Shore Hospital, St Leonards, New South Wales, Australia
5Attending Intensivist, Intensive Care Unit, University Hospital of Saint Luc, Brussels, Belgium
6Director, Patient and Visitor Relations/Patient Representative Program, University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics, Iowa City, Iowa, USA
7PhD Candidate, Department of Health Care Ethics, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA
Correspondence: Critical Care Editorial Office, editorial@ccforum.com
Published online: 6 February 2004 Critical Care 2004, 8:79-84 (DOI 10.1186/cc2451)
This article is online at http://ccforum.com/content/8/2/79
© 2004 BioMed Central Ltd (Print ISSN 1364-8535; Online ISSN 1466-609X)
Abstract
The decision to withdraw or withhold life supporting treatment in moribund patients is difficult under
any circumstances. When the patient becomes incompetent to clarify their wishes regarding continued
maintenance in long-term facilities, surrogates sometimes cannot agree, further clouding the issue. We
examine a case where the State’s interests come into play, forcing a controversial resolution.
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This is both a legal and an ethical issue. It is required that
doctors obey the law. The law of the State in which this
patient’s resides is that there must be clear and convincing
evidence of the patient’s wishes before life support can be
removed from that patient. I suspect that in these
circumstances the feeding tube may be defined as life
support. If we can almost consider patients’ wishes in terms
of levels of evidence, then we would class the evidence for
removal of the feeding tube being in keeping with the
woman’s wishes as the lowest level of evidence, as opposed
to the best evidence, namely an appropriate written directive
by a well patient. As with all expressed wishes by whatever
means, it is often difficult to determine their relevance to the
prevailing situation. Did the patient’s casually expressed wish
– stated when she was not suffering – disclose her views
regarding artificial feeding?
It appears to me from the information given that the feeding
tube may not be removed because this would be illegal. If the
family agreed, however, then it may be the case that in
practice the tube may still be removed on an ethical basis,
and the expressed wish be respected.
In my state in Australia, legally the tube could be removed if
‘death is imminent’. Death is not imminent in this case, but if
there was family consensus that continued tube feeding was
against the patient’s wishes then the tube could be removed.
If there were clearly expressed wishes that the patient would
not wish to continue the feeds they would be discontinued. It
is unlikely that the law would have an interest in the absence
of conflict.
Our society empowers us to work with families to determine
to the best of our ability what the patient’s wishes would be,
and to act on these wishes to withdraw treatment that the
patient would not want. In most circumstances, conflicts
between families regarding appropriate treatment are
resolved over time. To act supporting the views of one side of
a family conflict may be a recipe for disaster.
I have a further problem with removing the tube. An important
part of our processes are that the first step is medical
consensus. We do not have medical consensus as to the
outcome in this case. We are not told whether any of the
conflicting doctors’ opinions are related to a belief that some
unproven or unaccepted therapy (e.g. herbal remedies, coma
arousal therapy, or hyperbaric therapy) may be of benefit. In
the absence of united medical opinion it is extremely unlikely
that the family conflicts will be resolved easily, or that an
ethics committee or judge would support withdrawal.
Therefore, I would act conservatively and continue to feed, as
long as the patient is not suffering, and seek medical
consensus before resuming negotiation with the family. If the
patient were suffering then it would usually be easier to
resolve the family’s conflict.
Until and unless there is a clear-cut medical consensus as to
outcome, I would continue to feed.




The Professional Code and Conduct of the Medical Council
of Hong Kong describes care of the terminally ill [1]. It
delineates the ethical principles and communication
pathways in making decisions on withholding or withdrawing
LST, emphasizes the importance of a proper consensus-
building process, and recommends approaches to handle
disagreement. The Medical Council Code defines euthanasia
as ‘direct intentional killing of a person as part of the medical
care being offered’. This practice is viewed as being
unethical and illegal. The Hospital Authority, which
administers all public hospitals in Hong Kong, also supports
this view.
The Hospital Authority has produced detailed guidelines on
LST in the terminally ill [2]. It has defined LST as all
treatments that have the potential to postpone the patient’s
death, and agrees that it is ethical and legally acceptable to
withhold or withdraw LST when a mentally competent and
properly informed patient refuses LST and/or the treatment is
futile.
In Hong Kong the legal system has minimal impact on
medical ethical decision making. There is no legislation
regarding patient autonomy or the status of advance
directives [3].
Artificial nutrition and hydration are classified as medical
treatments and are regarded as being different from the offer
of oral food and fluid, which are regarded as basic care.
Because of this distinction, the Hospital Authority considers
that (other than when death is imminent and inevitable or
when it is the clearly expressed wish of a mentally competent
patient) withholding or withdrawing artificial nutrition and
hydration should be subject to additional safeguards,
including in some cases legal review.
When death is not imminent and inevitable, withholding or
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration in mentally
incompetent patients without valid advance directives
requires additional procedural safeguards. Even if requested
or supported by the family and there is consensus with the81
care team, the proposal requires a formal clinical review by a
senior clinician who is not part of the treating team. All such
cases also require review by the Hospital Chief Executive,
the Hospital Authority Head Office and, in patients in a PVS
or a state closely resembling it, a formal declaration from the
Court of First Instance.
In the scenario provided there has not been a clear didactic
statement regarding the forgoing of LST by the patient. This is
the norm in Hong Kong. Moreover, there is a lack of consensus
among medical professionals on the degree of neurologic
disability, although it is agreed that there is severe neurologic
deficit. The polarized views of the husband and parents of the
patient should be resolved by further communication to clarify
incorrect or unrealistic information. This may include
moderation by a hospital ethics committee in an attempt to
reach a consensus. After 2 years of institutionalization, both
parties are entrenched in their positions. Under such
circumstances application to the Guardianship Board of Hong
Kong to appoint a guardian would be undertaken [4].
Assuming the dispute is unresolvable, application to the Court
of First Instance would be possible. However, while not
attempting to prejudge the Court, it would probably act to
preserve life because the patient had not expressed a clear
and convincing viewpoint, the family dispute remained
unresolved, and medical opinion was divided.
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Life support preferences: if you don’t talk early you’ll lose your voice
David Crippen
Withdrawing life support from patients with unrelenting pain
and suffering or who are in a terminal death spiral should be
considered humane and beneficent. Withdrawing such
treatment from those whose indolence and seeming apathy
we do not understand is another problem entirely. The reality
is that we have many words to describe how patients in a
PVS look, but we do not have any to describe how they feel.
Accordingly, as long as the patient does not appear to be in
pain or suffering, societal values mandate that we err on the
side of giving preservation of life the benefit of the doubt,
unless the patient does not want it.
An autonomous citizen may legally and ethically elect to forgo
life-sustaining measures by prospective declaration if ‘quality
of life’ (QoL) does not rise to meet their expectation [5].
However, they must make that declaration before they
become incompetent. If they become incompetent with no
record of their wishes then decision making falls to relatives,
and that complicates matters greatly because surrogates do
not carry the same weight of authority. When authority
becomes diffused, the State develops an interest in the
proceedings. The State is charged with protecting its
citizens, and there is a thin line between ‘quality of life’ as
measured by an individual and ‘quantity of life’ as interpreted
by the State. The State can and frequently does step in to
supersede the wishes of individuals when gray areas occur.
There is no convincing evidence that this patient left any
durable record of her wishes not to be maintained in her
current condition. The family cannot come to a consensus.
There is convincing evidence that this patient responds to
her environment and is not in a death spiral or unrelenting
suffering. This woman’s situation is definitely a gray area that
the State has an obligation to consider. The State usually
feels an obligation to err on the side of preserving life when
the rigorous criteria for withdrawal of life support are not met
or there is no durable record of the patient’s preferences
[6]. Because the evidence of the patient’s prospective
wishes is arguable, the State has an obligation to argue it
and should err on the side of preservation, all other factors
being equal.
This unfortunate patient is a poster for prospective durable
powers of attorney attesting to their wishes should they
unexpectedly become moribund and incompetent. The price
paid for this policy is some indolent shells of humanity that
may be maintained in a hopeless condition, but it also avoids
the pitfalls of individuals assassinating innocents capriciously.
It is the lesser of two evils. We have enough problems
deciding when to withdraw life support when the indications
are much clearer. We are not ready to start burying people




Withdrawal of LST has become a very complex issue
because all of the interventions in medicine aim to prolong
life, whereas withdrawal ends it. A complicating issue is the
young age of the patient.
There is no agreement that she is in PVS, which for the sake of
simplicity may be defined as unconsciousness with eyes open.
She minimally interacts with her environment but does not
follow commands. It is not unreasonable to state that this
patient may be in a minimally conscious state (MCS) – a
recently proposed entity. MCS differs from PVS in that it is a
condition of severely altered consciousness with minimal but
definite behavioral evidence of self or environmental
awareness. Although the two groups have not been extensively
studied, in an outcome study conducted by Giacino and
Kalmar [7], patients in MCS fared better than those in PVS.
The differences become progressively more apparent in
traumatic brain injury patients and many months after injury.82
Furthermore, the patient never expressed any explicit wishes
regarding withdrawing LST in situations such as this. A
young, healthy woman does not consider end-of-life issues in
detail, thus the casual mention attributed to her that she
would not like to ‘live like a vegetable’. It is unclear exactly
what she may have meant by that. Death with ‘dignity’ is
quoted as the reason for the request for removal of the
feeding tube but it is hard for me to justify the removal of her
feeding tube on the grounds of dignity alone. If anything, she
appears to be living in dignity as she is. Withdrawal of LST
appears to be more synonymous with euthanasia.
My upbringing colors my practice of medicine. I was born
and raised in Greece and I am a Christian Greek Orthodox.
This background makes it particularly difficult for me to end a
life in most circumstances. Even when a patient is brain
dead, extra caution is required. I feel that withdrawal of LST
should be reserved for terminally ill patients or those whose
pain and suffering cannot be palliated. If a court ordered me
to remove a feeding tube in a patient that I do not feel is in
distress, I might refuse on the grounds of personal moral
values.
A number of gray areas in this case push me toward
preservation of life. Apart from the uncertainty of the patient’s
wishes, she does not appear to be in pain or distress. She
has been repeatedly seen smiling and seemingly interacting
with her family. She has not suffered a somatic complication
associated with brain injury. There are do decubiti, and no
aspiration pneumonitis or severe infections. Her airway is
clear and she does not require a tracheostomy. There are
people willing and able to provide the necessary supportive
care. Accordingly, I would have not removed the feeding tube
from this patient.
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In the name of the patient
Christine L Scheetz
It is the patient’s right to specify her wishes regarding end-of-
life care and to have these wishes respected by her health
care providers. Given the patient’s PVS, her husband, as her
legal surrogate, assumes this right and responsibility on her
behalf. It may be acknowledged that the patient could
emerge from this state at any time; however, the decision to
remove the feeding tube must be made on the basis of what
realistically can be expected to occur, not the hope of an
uncertain or improbable event.
Despite ‘appearances’ that the patient is responsive, and
despite differing opinions regarding the extent of the patient’s
brain damage, there is agreement that she suffers severe
neurologic deficit and has shown no evidence of meaningful
recovery of brain function for 2 years. Therefore, there is no
reason to believe, with any probability, that this patient will
return to a level of cognitive functioning or minimal QoL that
she expressed she would want if she were to continue living.
The family states that the patient is ‘not in any discomfort’,
and regardless of whether this is true the patient did not
state this as a criterion for wanting to continue life in a
vegetative state. The only comment anyone can remember
the patient making about living in a vegetative state supports
her husband’s decision to remove the feeding tube, thus
allowing the patient to die. Still, the husband likely is not
making a decision based solely on this one comment but
rather on a more comprehensive understanding of the
patient’s values, beliefs, and preferences. As the patient’s
spouse, he has the legal and ethical responsibility to respect
the patient’s wishes, and to act as he believes she wants and
would have indicated had she stated her preferences before
the anoxic injury. There is no evidence that the husband is
acting against the patient’s previously acknowledged and
stated opinion regarding not wanting to live in a vegetative
state.
Furthermore, he is following the ethical obligation of the
surrogate decision maker in two ways. First, he is following
the wishes stated by his wife. Second, because an absolute
directive does not exist, he is applying his substituted
judgment to make the decision.
The patient had not specified someone other than her
husband to make medical decisions on her behalf, and
therefore it probably was the patient’s understanding that her
husband, as legally recognized next of kin, would be making
proxy medical decisions for her in the event she was unable
to make these decisions for herself. It is the patient’s right to
have this legally recognized surrogate act on her behalf.
I would recommend that the husband’s request to remove
the feeding tube be honored.
Standards and evidence are important in choice
Leslie M Whetstine
In the USA competent citizens have the right to choose their
own course of treatment, and they do not lose that right once
incapacitated [8]. However, in order to retain the right of self-
determination, individuals are responsible for making their
wishes known prospectively by an advanced directive or a
durable power of attorney. Even with these mechanisms in
place, however, some amount of interpretation will probably
be necessary. Therefore, communication in conjunction with
documentation is key if scenarios such as the one presented
are to be avoided.83
The fundamental problem in this case is the lack of objective
evidence indicating the patient’s wishes, compounded by
family disagreement. This conflict forces several issues: what
level of evidence is required to justify removal of LST, which
standard of surrogacy should be applied, and how ought
QoL and the preservation of life be balanced?
The standards for surrogacy are different than for
autonomous individuals. For a surrogate to authorize removal
of LST from a patient in a nonterminal condition, there must
be compelling evidence indicative of the patient’s wishes.
Individual states may also require clear and convincing
evidence before LST is removed [9]. Furthermore, there are
three standards of surrogacy that may be used when a
patient becomes incapacitated: substituted judgment, limited
objective standard, and the best interests standard. Because
there is no compelling evidence of the patient’s wishes, a
genuine substituted judgment cannot be made. A limited
objective standard of surrogacy cannot be used either
because there is dissention among the family, making it
difficult to extrapolate what the patient would want.
In this case, it seems appropriate to apply a best interests
standard, in which the burdens and benefits of LST are
weighed. This method considers QoL judgments using a
‘reasonable person’ standard – what a reasonable person
would desire in the particular circumstances. It would be
disingenuous to suggest that QoL does not factor into LST
termination issues. However, it must be clear that QoL
judgments should be applied by autonomous individuals who
understand all of the factors involved. Society may not impose
objective QoL assessments to facilitate removal of LST from
individuals perceived as unworthy or useless without risking
the welfare of entire populations of disabled or otherwise
disenfranchized citizens. The State has an interest in
protecting vulnerable parties, and thus its role is often viewed
as a parental one, usually favoring the preservation of life
unless the continuance of life is viewed as cruel or inhumane.
In a State that requires clear and convincing evidence, unless
the family can demonstrate that the patient would refuse
such LST or that its maintenance is inhumane, the State has
the right to intervene on her behalf to ensure that QoL
decisions are not made capriciously. It would seem from her
demonstrated interaction with her environment that continued
treatment is not inhumane, nor does it foster a life that is
overly burdensome. Therefore, LST, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, should be continued.
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Wrap up: some concluding thoughts
Anthony L DeWitt
In a perfect world citizens would assume the duty to make
provisions for the end of their natural lives by making wills for
the disposition of their property, and by making declarations
regarding their desires for end-of-life care. The world is a far
from perfect place, and a stunning number of people never
plan for the end of their lives at any level. Failure to plan for
termination of life support, except among the infirm and
elderly, is almost universal.
The need for end-of-life planning is most acute among the
young, for whom trauma and incapacitation are a frequent
consequence of poor lifestyle choices. Because young
people often feel immortal, frequently parents and spouses
are left to make decisions regarding what should be done,
usually at the time of greatest grief and guilt. Human
emotions frequently cloud reason, making the health care
provider’s job that much more difficult because the import of
this failure to plan is that health care providers are given a
Hobson’s choice: get agreement from the family or, barring
that, seek approval from the courts for end-of-life decisions.
Common law courts are poor substitutes for family in end-of-
life decision making because they do not apply the standards
of the family, and instead apply legal standards that are easily
manipulated (e.g. see [10]). Although it would unduly tax this
article to summarize the standards in all states, some states
require clear and convincing evidence of intent whereas
others apply more liberal standards to permit termination of
life support. Some states place extraordinary weight on the
patient’s religious beliefs (e.g. see [11]) whereas other
merely consider this a factor. In nearly all states a prior
written declaration of intention, as expressed in a written
document, are deemed controlling with respect to the
intention of the incompetent person [12]. Sadly, these
documents may be collaterally attacked by parol evidence
demonstrating that the incompetent had a change of mind at
some later point. Moreover, although the parent normally has
the right to speak for the child, a parent may lose that right in
cases of abuse or neglect [13].
A health care provider is frequently on the horns of a
dilemma; does the provider rely on the parents’ quiet
acquiescence to termination of life support (e.g. see [14]) or
does the provider wisely seek a court appointed guardian to
speak for the incompetent? A health care provider or
institution is as likely to be sued for failure to terminate life
support as for failure to maintain it (e.g. see [15]). As a result,
where there is any disunity among the family or any question
as to the proper course of action, the wisest course is to
require court involvement so as to protect the physician and
providers from claims of improper termination of life support.
A legislative fix is desirable. Ideally, a requirement for
graduation from any high school should include a completed
health care declaration regarding end-of-life treatment. A
mandatory part of every driver’s license renewal should be a84
demonstration that the driver has a valid end-of-life declaration
on file with the Recorder of Deeds. Until such time as these
documents are mandated, courts and providers will continue
to incur needless costs and endless delays in rendering LSTs.
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